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FRACK ATTACKS: GOVERNMENT COMPLIANCE -- OR LACK 
THEREOF -- WITH FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON TRIBAL LANDS 
 
Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fracking is a technique used in oil and gas drilling that involves 
using large amounts of water, sand, and chemicals to extract fuel from the 
ground.2 Fracking is more common today than it has been in the past, 
including on Indian lands. Because Indian lands are held in trust by the 
federal government, tribes have less discretion as to what to do with their 
lands than if the lands were privately held. While environmental effects 
must be considered, tribes generally benefit from royalties on oil and gas 
mining leases for fracking purposes. However, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”) mismanagement has caused tribes to miss out on tens of millions 
of dollars in energy development opportunities.3 Some tribes rely heavily 
                                                 
1 Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 2016 WL 1254427 (N.D. Okla. 2016), appeal filed 
sub nom Hayes v. Osage Minerals, et al. (10th Cir. May 24, 2016). 
2 Rita Ann Cicero, Judge Blocks New Rule for Fracking on Public Lands, 36 NO. 6 
WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 3, at *1 (Oct. 14, 2015). 
3 Michael Bastasch, Obama Allows Indians To Grow Pot, But Not Drill For Oil On their 
Own Lands, THE DAILY CALLER NEWS FOUNDATION (Oct. 8, 2015, 1:18 PM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2015/10/08/obama-allows-indians-to-grow-pot-but-not-drill-for-
oil-on-their-own-lands/. Opportunities involve both green energy and fossil fuels. Id.  
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on oil and gas revenues.4 This note examines a case indicating that the 
BIA’s mismanagement has been harmful, particularly in Osage County, 
Oklahoma. Hayes is the first of its kind to invalidate a federal lease and 
drilling permits approved by the BIA because of failure to comply with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 1872, Congress established a reservation for the Osage Nation5 
in Oklahoma.6 In 1904 and 1905, large quantities of oil and gas were 
discovered on the reservation.7 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the 
Osage Allotment Act,8 placing the mineral estate underlying the Osage 
lands in trust and directing the Secretary of the Interior to collect and 
distribute royalty income to tribal members on a quarterly, pro rata basis.9   
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Barbara Moschovidis, Osage Nation v. Irby: The Tenth Circuit Disregards Legal 
Precedent to Strip Osage County of its Reservation Status, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 189, 
191 (2012). In 1870, the federal government removed the Osage from Kansas, sold the 
land, and used the proceeds to purchase land from the Cherokee.  Id. 
6 Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *1; see Act of June 5, 187217 Stat. 228 (1871) (“An Act 
to confirm to the Great and Little Osage Indians a Reservation in the Indian Territory.”). 
7 Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *1. 
8 Act of June 28, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-321, 34 Stat. 539 (1905). 
9 Id. The government’s trusteeship over the mineral estate was originally set to last 
twenty-five years but has been extended in perpetuity. Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *1 
(citing Pub. L. No. 95-496, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 1660 (1978)). 
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Osage Nation may lease portions of the mineral estate for 
exploration and development with the Secretary of the Interior’s approval, 
under such rules and regulations as she may prescribe.10 The Secretary of 
the Interior has delegated that approval authority to the Superintendent of 
the Osage Agency within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.11 No operations are 
permitted upon any tract of land until the Superintendent approves a lease 
covering the tract.12 To commence drilling, a lessee must obtain additional 
approval from the Superintendent.13 The Superintendent’s approval of 
leases and drilling permits on Osage lands constitutes federal action 
subject to NEPA.14 
NEPA is a process-oriented statute requiring federal agencies to 
consider the environmental impact of their actions.15 This dispute involves 
the government’s obligations under NEPA with regard to approval of an 
oil and gas lease and two drilling permits in Osage County, Oklahoma.16 
In 1978, the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma entered a 
                                                 
10 2016 WL 1254427, at *1 (citing 1906 Act § 3). 
11 Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 226.4, 226.5(b) (2014)). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at *2.  
15 Id. at *1. 
16 Id. 
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judgment ordering the Secretary of the Interior and the Superintendent of 
the Osage Agency to prepare an Environmental Assessment.17 The 
Assessment covered the effects of oil and gas operations under oil mining 
leases, gas mining leases, oil and gas mining leases, drilling permits, water 
use authorizations, and other documents the Secretary used relating to oil 
and gas operations on the land in Osage County.18  
In 1979, the Osage Agency issued the Environmental Assessment, 
evaluating all aspects of its oil and gas leasing program in Osage 
County.19 The Assessment provided a detailed explanation of the leasing 
program, a description of the county’s existing and likely future 
environmental conditions, and an evaluation of the leasing program’s 
actual or potential environmental impacts.20 The Assessment also 
described drilling techniques and practices within the county, briefly 
mentioning fracking.21 The Assessment ultimately concluded that the 
leasing program would not have a significant impact on the human 
                                                 
17 Id. at *2. 
18 Id. 




environment.22 Notably, the projections in the Assessment were limited to 
the year 2000.23 Based on the Assessment’s findings, the Osage Agency 
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”).24 
In January 2013, Chaparral entered into an oil and gas lease with 
Osage Nation for a 160-acre portion of the Osage mineral estate 
underlying Plaintiff Hayes’s property.25 Then, the BIA approved the 
lease.26 The BIA determined that its approval fell within the exception for 
mineral lease adjustment and transfer approval, which includes 
assignments and subleases.27 In April 2014, Chaparral submitted a drilling 
permit application to the BIA, and the BIA approved the application.28  
In May 2014, Chaparral submitted an amended drilling permit 
application, moving the proposed well site 100 feet to the west.29 The BIA 
approved the amended application but did not prepare a new NEPA 
document, supplement, tier to, incorporate, or otherwise explicitly adopt 










the 1979 Assessment’s analysis.30 In August 2014, Hayes brought suit 
against the United States, the Department of the Interior, the BIA, and 
Chaparral under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),31 alleging the 
government’s approval of the lease and the original and amended drilling 
permits failed to comply with NEPA.32 When a government agency fails 
to comply with NEPA before approving lease and drilling permits, then 
those lease and drilling permits will be declared void from the beginning.33 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA was enacted in 1946 and governs federal agency 
action.34 An “agency” is an authority of the federal government,35 and 
“agency action” includes an agency rule, order, or failure to act.36 Final 
agency actions are subject to judicial review.37 A person suffering legal 
wrong or adverse effects because of an agency action is entitled to judicial 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 5 U.S.C § 551 et seq. (2012). 
32 Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *4. 
33 Id. at *1. This holding has since been superseded so that failure to comply with NEPA 
renders lease approvals invalid. Id. 
34 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
35 Id. There are some exceptions. See id. § 551(1). 
36 § 551(13).  
37 § 704.  
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review.38 An agency’s action may be overturned if a court determines the 
action was arbitrary and capricious.39 Agency action is arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency (1) failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem; (2) offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or agency expertise;40 (3) failed to base its 
decision on consideration of the relevant factors; or (4) made a clear error 
of judgment.41 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act and Council on 
Environmental Quality Regulations 
 
NEPA was enacted in 1970 and aims to avoid uninformed 
decision-making on environmental issues by requiring agencies to gather 
and document information concerning environmental impacts of that 
agency’s actions.42 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare 
Environmental Impact Statements before taking any major federal actions 
that could significantly affect the quality of the human environment.43 If 
                                                 
38 § 702. 
39 § 704. 
40 Jagers v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2014). 
41 Utah Envt’l Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir. 2007). 
42 See Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii) (2012). 
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an agency is uncertain whether an Environmental Impact Statement is 
required, it may elect to prepare a less-detailed Environmental 
Assessment.44 NEPA ensures the agency will only reach a decision on a 
proposed action after carefully considering environmental impacts of the 
proposed action.45  
Federal agencies are required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment for any proposed action unless: (1) the agency has elected or 
is otherwise required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement; or 
(2) the agency action is subject to a categorical exclusion.46 If, after 
preparing an Environmental Assessment, the agency concludes that a 
proposed action will not significantly affect the environment, the agency 
may issue a FONSI and does not need to prepare a full Environmental 
Impact Statement.47 Agency action can be either broad or specific.48 Broad 
agency action includes adopting official policies, plans, or programs. 
                                                 
44 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 145 (2010). 
45 Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 717 (10th Cir. 2010). 
46 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4(a), (b) (2014). 
47 McKeen v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1244, 1248 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010). 
48 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (2014). 
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Specific agency action includes approving specific projects.49 Both broad 
and specific agency actions require compliance with NEPA.50 
An Environmental Assessment allows the agency to consider 
environmental concerns while reserving agency resources.51 An Impact 
Statement is a detailed document that identifies the potential impacts a 
proposal may have on the environment.52 When available, agencies are 
encouraged to use existing analyses for assessing the impacts of a 
proposed action and any alternatives.53 Supplementing, tiering to, 
incorporating by reference, or adopting previous Assessments are all 
acceptable methods for using existing analyses.54  
The Council on Environmental Quality is tasked with interpreting 
NEPA and establishing regulations governing agencies’ responsibilities 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Park City Res. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621 (10th Cir. 1987), 
overruled on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 
970 (10th Cir. 1992). 
52 Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.2d 1012, 1022 (10th 
Cir. 2002). 
53 43 C.F.R. § 46.120(a) (2014). 
54 Id. at §§ 46.120(d), 46.135, 46.140; 1502.20, 1508.28 (Tiering is a procedure in which 
an agency may incorporate statements from an existing broader Environmental Impact 
Statement to provide analysis for a subsequent, narrower NEPA document. Tiering is 
appropriate when the sequence of analyses is from a program, plan, or policy 
Environmental Impact Statement to a site-specific analysis). 
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under NEPA.55 The Council on Environmental Quality’s regulations 
require federal agencies to adopt further procedures identifying specific 
actions which either normally require an Impact Statement or are 
categorically excluded.56 The Department of the Interior’s supplemental 
NEPA regulations permit it and its constituent bureaus to use an existing 
Environmental Assessment in its entirety if the agency determines, with 
appropriate supporting documentation, that the Assessment adequately 
appraises the environmental effects of the proposed action and reasonable 
alternatives.57 An agency must supplement an Impact Statement or 
Assessment if there are significant new circumstances or information 
relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or 
its impacts.58 Generally, if a programmatic NEPA document is more than 
five years old, it should be carefully reexamined to determine whether 
supplementation is necessary.59 
                                                 
55 Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043, 1063 (10th Cir. 2015).  
56 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a) (2014). 
57 43 C.F.R. § 46.120(c) (2014). 
58 § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii). See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1238 n.19 
(10th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 55 (2004). 
59 Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,036 (Mar. 23, 1981). Other courts in the Tenth 
Circuit have considered this source when interpreting and implementing NEPA 
regulations. See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1125, 1125 n.17 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogated 
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Because NEPA is procedural and does not provide a right of 
action, a court will review an agency’s project approval, including 
compliance with NEPA, under the APA.60 The court will not set aside the 
agency’s decision unless the decision fails to meet statutory, procedural, or 
constitutional requirements, or unless the decision is an abuse of 
discretion, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.61 
C. Supreme Court of the United States and Tenth Circuit 
Precedent 
 
The Secretary of the Interior has the authority to ratify or reject 
leases relating to Indian lands.62 Environmental analyses aid agencies in 
determining what course of action should be taken in each situation.63 
NEPA applies to all federal agencies, including the BIA.64 Government 
approval of a project is the only involvement necessary to constitute major 
federal action.65 In Davis, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the District of New 
                                                                                                                         
by Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016). 
60 Morris v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677, 690 (10th Cir. 2010). 
61 Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)). 
62 Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 595, 595 (10th Cir. 1972). 
63 Id. at 596. 
64 Id. at 598 (citing Nat’l Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.3d 650 (10th Cir. 1971)). 
65 Id. at 597. 
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Mexico had erred in holding that a lease to a development company, on 
the Tesuque Indian Reservation in Santa Fe County, did not constitute 
major federal action.66 Davis held that just because Indian lands are held 
in trust does not take lease approval out of NEPA’s jurisdiction.67 So, 
unless another statute’s obligations are clearly mutually exclusive from 
NEPA’s mandates, NEPA’s specific requirements remain in force.68 
Therefore, the Department’s initial lease approval was invalid because the 
requisite environmental study did not precede the lease approval.69 
Department of Interior approval is required for a lease on federal 
lands to be valid.70 An agency’s failure to comply with NEPA before 
approving a lease on federal lands renders the agency’s lease approval 
invalid.71 In Sangre, the development company from Davis alleged it had 
a vested interest protected under the Fifth Amendment at the time the 
alleged taking occurred, and the Department of the Interior rescinding its 
lease approval constituted a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment.72 The 
                                                 
66 Id. at 596. 
67 Id. at 597. 
68 Id. 
69 Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. U.S., 932 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1991). 
70 Id. at 894. 
71 Id. at 894-95. 
72 Id. at 894. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Tenth Circuit held 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) requires a valid approval from the 
Department of the Interior in order for the lease contract to have legal 
effect, so the invalid lease contract between Sangre and the Pueblo vested 
no property interest in Sangre.73 Therefore, Sangre could not have been 
divested of a leasehold interest because Sangre’s interest never vested in 
the first place.74  
Categorical exclusions influence whether an agency must prepare 
an environmental analysis for a particular action.75 Once an agency 
establishes categorical exclusions, its decision to classify a proposed 
action as falling within a particular categorical exclusion will be set aside 
only if a court determines that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.76 
In Citizens’ Committee, the Forest Service concluded an interchange of 
public and private lands fell within a categorical exclusion exempting land 
exchanges from NEPA review “where resulting land uses remain 
essentially the same.”77 Even though the public land was relatively 
                                                 
73 Sangre, 932 F.2d at 895. 
74 Id. 
75 Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 1012, 1023 (10th 
Cir. 2002).  
76 Id. (citing Friends of Richards-Gebaur v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 251 F.3d 1178, 1187 
(8th Cir. 2001)). 
77 Id. at 1023-24 (quoting Forest Serv. Handbook 1909.15 § 31.1b(7)). The interchange 
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undeveloped, the Forest Service noted the public land was already subject 
to skiing activity; therefore transferring ownership would not alter its 
essential use or character.78 The Tenth Circuit concluded the Forest 
Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when the Forest Service 
concluded the activity on the federal lands exchanged in the interchange 
would remain essentially the same.79 
Courts perform a two-part test to determine whether the agency 
should have supplemented its Environmental Impact Statement or 
Environmental Assessment.80 First, the court will look to see if the agency 
took a “hard look” at the new information to determine whether 
supplemental analysis was necessary.81 Courts may consider whether the 
agency obtained expert opinions, gave careful scientific scrutiny, 
responded to all legitimate concerns raised, or otherwise provided a 
reasoned explanation for the new circumstance’s lack of significance.82 
                                                                                                                         
involved public land and a ski resort. Id. at 1012. 
78 Id. at 1024. 
79 Id. 
80 S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d on 
other grounds, 542 U.S. 55 (2004). 
81 Id. (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Medford Dist., 914 F.2d 1174, 
1177 (9th Cir. 1990)).  
82 Id. (citing Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Johnson, 165 F.3d 283, 288 (4th 
Cir. 1999)). 
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Second, if the court determines the agency took the hard look, the court 
then reviews the agency’s decision not to issue a supplemental 
Environmental Assessment or Impact Statement under the APA’s arbitrary 
and capricious standard.83  
In S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, the Wilderness Alliance 
challenged the Bureau of Land Management, and the Tenth Circuit 
remanded the case to the District of Utah to determine whether the Bureau 
of Land Management had failed to take a hard look at information 
suggesting off-road vehicle use in the disputed areas had substantially 
increased since the environmental analyses were issued.84 The Supreme 
Court of the United States determined evidence of increased off-road 
vehicle use did not require the Bureau of Land Management to take a hard 
look at the need to supplement its Environmental Impact Statement.85 The 
Supreme Court of the United States reiterated supplementation is only 
required if major federal action remains to be taken.86 Although approving 
a land use plan is a major federal action requiring an Impact Statement, the 
                                                 
83 Id. (citing Marsh v. Or. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)). 
84 Id. at 1240. The challenged analyses were dated from 1990, 1991, 1980, and 1985. Id. 
at 1237 n.18. 
85 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 55 (2004). 
86 Id. at 73 (citing Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989)). 
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action is completed when the plan is approved.87 So, there was no ongoing 
major federal action that required supplementation at the time, although 
the Bureau of Land Management would be required to perform additional 
analysis if a plan is amended or revised.88 
Categorical exclusions promote efficiency in the NEPA review 
process.89 By definition, a categorical exclusion does not create a 
significant environmental effect, so analyses do not need to be performed 
unless there are extraordinary circumstances.90 A court may reject the 
agency’s interpretation of its categorical exclusions only when the 
interpretation is unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with the 
exclusion’s plain meaning.91 In Bosworth, the Utah Environmental 
Congress argued the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by 
authorizing the Seven Mile Project pursuant to a categorical exclusion.92 
The Tenth Circuit first looked at the exclusion’s plain meaning, then 
determined that the Forest Service previously did the extensive 
                                                 
87 Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6 (2003)). 
88 Id. (citing §§ 1610.5-5, 5-6 (2003)). 
89 Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 742 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fund for 
Animals v. Babbitt, 89 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
90 Id. at 741 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2003)). 
91 Id. at 740 (quoting Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
92 Id. 
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environmental analysis in creating the categorical exclusion.93 Thus, to 
require monitoring, documentation, and review of data that do not trigger 
extraordinary circumstances would defeat the categorical exclusions’ 
purpose.94 So, according to the Tenth Circuit, the Seven Mile Project was 
in compliance with the APA and NEPA.95 
Questions may arise when there is a broad agency action followed 
by a narrower, site-specific action.96 If an agency adopts an official 
program and, in furtherance thereof, later approves a specific project, the 
agency ordinarily must prepare a separate Environmental Assessment or 
Impact Statement for both actions.97 In Richardson, the parties disputed 
over how the natural gas drilling environmental analysis in the broad plan 
should be tiered.98 The Tenth Circuit held it was clear from the record the 
Company had concrete plans to build thirty natural gas wells on the land, 
and the Company had obtained the permits for a gas pipeline, so the 
environmental impacts of the planned gas field were reasonably 
                                                 
93 Id. at 750 (citing Colo. Wild. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 
2006)). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 753. 
96 New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 688 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
97 Id. at 703. 
98 Id. at 716. 
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foreseeable before the specific lease was issued.99 Thus, NEPA required 
analysis of the lease’s site-specific impacts prior to issuance, and the 
Bureau of Land Management acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing 
to conduct one.100 
Courts distinguish between broad agency action followed by a 
specific project, like in Richardson, and merely a broad agency action. An 
agency may not be required to include a site-specific analysis of every 
area a broad agency action affects.101 The Tenth Circuit has held neither 
NEPA nor the Council on Environmental Quality regulations require an 
agency to include a site-specific analysis for every particular area a 
proposed action affects.102 Wyoming involves a challenge to the Forest 
Service’s adoption of a nationwide rule prohibiting road construction and 
certain other activities on lands within the national forest system 
designated as road-less areas.103 Wyoming asserted the Forest Service’s 
Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed rule violated NEPA 
because it failed to include a site-specific analysis of every area the rule 
                                                 
99 Id. at 718. 
100 Id. at 718-19. 
101 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011). 
102 Id. at 1255. 
103 Id. at 1222. 
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affects.104 The Tenth Circuit held broad agency action alone does not 
require site-specific environmental analysis.105 
Neither NEPA nor the APA requires reversal for trivial errors.106 
Even if an agency violates the APA, its error does not require reversal 
unless a plaintiff demonstrates prejudice resulting from the error.107 
Deficiencies in environmental analyses that do not defeat NEPA’s 
informed decision-making goals will not lead to reversal.108 In Hillsdale, 
several groups brought challenges to a dredge and fill permit the Army 
Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) issued under the Clean Water Act and 
NEPA.109 The District of Kansas granted summary judgment for the 
Corps, and Hillsdale appealed, alleging the Corps failed to prepare an 
adequate Environmental Assessment and failed to prepare a full Impact 
                                                 
104 Id. at 1254. 
105 Id. at 1256. 
106 See Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 702 F.3d 
1156, 1165 (10th Cir. 2012). 
107 Id. (quoting Prairie Band Pottawatomie Nation v. Fed. Highway Admin., 684 F.3d 
1002, 1008 (10th Cir. 2012)). 
108 Id. (quoting New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 
704 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
109 Id. at 1162. 
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Statement.110 The Tenth Circuit concluded the record supported the Corps’ 
decision, and the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.111 
Even though courts give agencies tremendous deference in many 
aspects, a court will reject an agency’s interpretation of a categorical 
exclusion when the interpretation is based on a legal conclusion 
inconsistent with the exclusion’s plain meaning. When a lease requires 
agency approval to be legally operative and a court determines the agency 
approved such a lease in violation of NEPA, the determination necessarily 
invalidates the underlying lease unless or until valid agency approval.112 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, Plaintiff challenges the BIA’s approval of the 
Chaparral lease and drilling permits for failure to comply with NEPA.113 
The BIA responds that its lease approval fell within a categorical 
exclusion, and the 1979 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
Significant Impact covered its approval of the drilling permits.114 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, No. 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC, 2016 WL 1175238, at 
*10 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 23, 2016). 
113 Id. at *4. 
114 Id. at *2. 
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Once an agency establishes categorical exclusion, its decision to 
classify a proposed action as falling within a particular categorical 
exclusion will be set aside only if a court determines the agency’s decision 
was arbitrary and capricious.115 So, the court must give substantial 
deference to the agency’s interpretations of its own categorical exclusions, 
and the court may only reject that interpretation when it is unreasonable, 
plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with the exclusion’s plain meaning.116 
The Department of the Interior has designated the BIA’s approval of 
mineral lease adjustments and transfers, including assignments and 
subleases, as a categorical exclusion.117 In determining its own approval of 
the Chaparral lease fell within the exclusion, the BIA necessarily 
interpreted the term “lease transfer” as including the initial transfer of a 
lease from a lessor to a lessee.118 Plaintiff asserts the exclusion only 
applies to adjusting or transferring existing leases, not executing new 
                                                 
115 Id. at *4 (citing Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 
1012, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002)).  
116 Id. (citing Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
117 Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Department Manual 516 
DM 10.5(G)(3) (2004)). 
118 Id. 
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leases.119 The BIA responds its interpretation is reasonable and is entitled 
to controlling weight.120 
First, the court looks to the categorical exclusion’s text in assessing 
the parties’ positions.121 The exclusion covers the “approval of mineral 
lease . . . transfers.”122 The language’s plain meaning precludes the BIA’s 
interpretation.123 The term “lease” refers to the initial transfer of a 
leasehold from a lessor to a lessee.124 Therefore, a lease “transfer” 
necessarily denotes the transfer of rights under an existing lease from a 
lessor or lessee to some third party.125 The BIA’s interpretation would 
render the word “transfer” virtually meaningless, so it is incompatible with 
the exclusion’s plain language.126 
The court also looks to the language’s context.127 The term “lease 
transfers” is not used in isolation, and the language refers to lease 
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at *5. 
122 Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Department Manual 







“adjustments and transfers.”128 Because a lease must exist before it can be 
adjusted, the text’s grouping of “adjustments and transfers” suggests the 
provision was intended to apply to actions on existing leases.129 
Second, the exclusion provision provides examples of a “lease 
transfer:” assignments and subleases, which both refer to transfers of an 
existing lease.130 Because both assignments and subleases share the basic 
characteristic of existing leases, that further indicates the provision was 
not meant to apply to a new lease’s creation.131 
Third, the BIA’s interpretation of “lease transfer” requires reading 
different language in two categorical exclusions as having the same 
meaning.132 The BIA’s Department Manual includes another categorical 
exclusion for approval of conveyances of interests in land where no 
change in the land use is planned.133 If the BIA meant for “lease transfers” 




131 Id. See Freeman v. Qucken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042 (2012) (“[T]he 
commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis . . . counsels that a word is given more precise 
content by the neighboring words with which it is associated”). See also 2A Norman J. 
Singer et al., SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:16 (7th ed. 2007) (“[W]hen 
two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are 
not equally comprehensive, a general word is limited and qualified by a special word.”). 
132 Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *5.  
133 Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Department Manual 516 
DM 10.5(I) (2004)). 
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to include the initial transfer of a leasehold interest from lessor to lessee, 
the language clearly indicates the BIA knew how to and could have done 
so.134 The BIA’s use of different language in other exclusions strongly 
suggests it intended different meanings for each exclusion.135 Therefore, 
the BIA’s determination that its approval of the Chaparral lease fell within 
a categorical exclusion was premised on a plainly erroneous legal 
interpretation, making the approval arbitrary and capricious.136 The lease 
contract between Chaparral and the Osage Nation vested no property 
interest in Chaparral because the regulations137 require valid approval 
from the government for a lease contract to have legal effect.138 
Plaintiff contends the 1979 Assessment was a broad, programmatic 
assessment of Osage County’s oil and gas leasing program and is too 
general to allow the BIA to issue the two site-specific drilling permits.139 
Plaintiff also submits that there are relevant significant new circumstances, 
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at *6. 
137 25 C.F.R. § 226.34(a) (2014). 
138 Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *5. An agency’s failure to comply with NEPA renders 
the agency action at issue invalid. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 932 F.2d 891, 894 (10th 
Cir. 1991). 
139 Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *6. 
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so the BIA’s reliance on the Assessment was arbitrary and capricious.140 
In response, the government argues the 1979 Assessment addressed all 
current and anticipated drilling in Osage County, so it automatically 
covers the BIA’s approval of the Chaparral drilling permits.141 
Alternatively, the government submits any violation on its part was trivial 
and harmless.142 
First, the Department of the Interior and the BIA are permitted to 
use an existing Environmental Assessment in its entirety if either entity 
determines the Assessment adequately appraises the environmental effects 
of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives.143 The BIA’s approval 
of a drilling permit is an agency action requiring, at a minimum, 
preparation of an Environmental Assessment.144 The 1979 Assessment is a 
broad, programmatic document meant to describe and evaluate all aspects 
of the oil and gas leasing program in Osage County as it is supervised 
under existing BIA regulations.145 The Assessment does not specifically 
address the environmental impact of BIA approval of the two Chaparral 
                                                 
140 Id. at *9. 
141 Id. at *7. 
142 Id. 




drilling permits.146 Applicable Department of the Interior regulations 
require the BIA to make an explicit determination with supporting 
documentation that the BIA believes the 1979 Assessment sufficiently 
covers such drilling permit approval so as to obviate the need for a new 
Assessment.147 Particularly, the supporting record must include an 
evaluation of whether new circumstances, information, or changes in the 
action or its impacts not previously analyzed may result in significantly 
different environmental effects.148 Here, the BIA did not follow these 
procedures or make any effort to explicitly incorporate, tier to, or adopt 
the 1979 Assessment’s analysis.149 Therefore, the court held the BIA 
failed to comply with NEPA.150 
The government’s argument that a programmatic Environmental 
Assessment automatically covers all site-specific agency action 
subsequently taken in furtherance of the program was unpersuasive.151 The 
government relied on a statement from the Tenth Circuit that neither 
NEPA nor the Council on Environmental Quality regulations require an 
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agency to include a site-specific analysis for every particular area a 
proposed action affects.152 The court deemed the government’s reliance on 
that statement misplaced because the proposed action in that case was a 
broad administrative action, and the action in this case was site-specific.153 
There, the Tenth Circuit did not hold a site-specific analysis is never 
required under NEPA or that somehow a programmatic Environmental 
Assessment automatically covers all site-specific agency action 
subsequently taken in furtherance of a relevant program.154 That case and 
its holding are irrelevant to the site-specific agency action at issue here 
because this case involves a broad action followed by a narrower, related 
action.155 
Here, the broad action is the BIA’s adoption of an oil and gas 
leasing program in Osage County, and the subsequent approval of the 
Chaparral drilling permits is the narrow action.156 Applying the Tenth 
Circuit’s holding, the BIA’s 1979 Assessment for the oil and gas leasing 
program does not need to include a site-specific analysis of every area the 
                                                 
152 Id. (citing Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
153 Id. NEPA does not require that agencies prepare a site-specific analysis for every 
specific location affected by a broad administrative action. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1255. 
154 Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *7. 
155 Id. at *8. 
156 Id. 
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oil and gas leasing program affects.157 This application does not indicate 
the Assessment automatically covers all site-specific drilling permits 
issued as part of the broader leasing program.158 Such a holding would 
plainly disregard applicable regulations and circuit precedent.159 Relying 
on a broad, programmatic Assessment to support site-specific agency 
action seeks to obtain the benefits of a categorical exclusion without going 
through the notice and comment procedures necessary to promulgate a 
categorical exclusion.160  
The government contends any NEPA violation on its part was 
trivial and harmless error.161 Neither NEPA nor the APA requires reversal 
for trivial errors, but here the error was not harmless.162 Here, the BIA has 
not gathered and documented information concerning the environmental 
impacts of its actions.163 Even before the court, the BIA did not provide 




160 Id. at*8 n.4. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. See Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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any supporting documentation to show the 1979 Assessment adequately 
covers its approval of the two Chaparral drilling permits.164 
The BIA’s approval of the two drilling permits required, at a 
minimum, for the BIA to either prepare a new Environmental Assessment 
or determine the 1979 Assessment adequately appraised the proposed 
action’s environmental effects with supporting documentation.165 The BIA 
did not do either, and failure to do so was a material violation of NEPA.166 
Reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare a supplemental 
Environmental Assessment is a two-step inquiry.167 First, the court 
addresses whether the agency took a “hard look” at the new information to 
determine whether supplemental analysis is necessary.168 Second, if the 
court determines the agency took the requisite “hard look,” then the court 
reviews the agency’s decision not to issue a supplemental Environmental 
Assessment under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.169  
Plaintiff contends the 1979 Assessment requires supplementation 
because there have been significant legal and technological changes since 
                                                 
164 Hayes, 2016 WL 125447, at *8 n.4. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at *9. 
168 Id. (quoting S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton 301 F.3d 1217, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002)).  
169 Id. 
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1979 relevant to the environmental impacts of drilling in Osage County, 
especially in regards to fracking’s growth and development.170 Plaintiff 
presents evidence that today, many well completions in Osage County 
involve fracking, unlike 1979, and the fracking involves much more fluid 
driven by significantly more horsepower than in 1979.171 Given these 
changes, Plaintiff contends the BIA’s reliance on the 1979 Assessment to 
support its approval of the two drilling permits was arbitrary and 
capricious.172 
Neither the administrative record nor the parties’ briefs contain any 
indication the BIA actually considered whether the 1979 Assessment 
requires supplementation.173 Even though the BIA states it made this 
determination prior to approving the Chaparral drilling permits, there is 
nothing in the record to support that assertion.174 But even if the BIA had 
made that determination, neither the record nor the government’s brief 
contains any explanation for such a decision.175 Therefore, the court 








cannot say that the BIA took the requisite “hard look” at new information 
to assess whether supplementation might be necessary.176 
Even if the BIA had consciously determined supplementation was 
unnecessary, that determination was arbitrary and capricious.177 The 1979 
Assessment does not contain any discussion of the environmental impacts 
of fracking.178 The Assessment merely notes fracking technology exists 
and is in its experimental stages.179 Today, numerous wells in Osage 
County involve fracking, and the systems, technology, and chemical 
completion fluids used in such operations have changed dramatically.180 
The government cannot reasonably contend these changes are insignificant 
or irrelevant to the environmental impacts of drilling operations in Osage 
County.181 The government’s reliance on the 1979 Assessment without 
supplementation was arbitrary and capricious.182 
                                                 
176 Id. (citing Norton v. S. Alliance Utah, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004)). 
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BIA’s approval of the two drilling permits violated NEPA for two 
independent reasons.183 First, the BIA did not prepare a new 
Environmental Assessment for the action, and it did not follow the 
procedures necessary to rely on the 1979 Assessment.184 Second, even if 
the BIA had followed the proper procedures, its reliance on the 1979 
Assessment without supplementation was arbitrary and capricious.185 
BIA’s approval of the Chaparral lease and two drilling permits failed to 
comply with NEPA.186 Therefore, the lease and drilling permits have no 
legal effect.187 
V. COMMENT 
A. What kind of Environmental Impact Statement or 
Environmental Assessment is Appropriate?  
 
 Hayes is the first of its kind to invalidate a federal oil lease and 
drilling permits approved by the BIA because of failure to comply with 
NEPA. The court’s decision to invalidate the leases fits within NEPA 
jurisprudence and reviews the BIA’s determination that an Environmental 




186 Id. at *11. 
187 Id. 
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Assessment from 1979 sufficiently covered a proposed oil lease and 
drilling project. In the case at bar, the decision is appropriate given the 
substantial growth in fracking drilling methods since 1979. While this 
particular situation would rarely occur again in the future (presumably the 
BIA would not make this same determination again), courts require 
agencies to pay close attention to when external circumstances have 
changed so much as to require supplementation or more recent 
Environmental Assessments.188 In the future, it may be difficult for 
agencies to tell when such external circumstances have changed to that 
degree to be “significant” before a judge makes such a finding.189  
                                                 
188 Cf. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (when reviewing an 
agency decision not to supplement an Environmental Impact Statement, courts should 
carefully review the record and the agency’s decision based on the agency’s evaluation of 
the significance of the new information). 
189 See generally Coker v. Skidmore, 941 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.7 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 
1508.27 (2014)). CEQ regulations define “significant” in relevant part requiring 
consideration of both context and intensity. Id. “Context” means an action’s significance 
must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole, the affected region, the 
affected interests, and the locality. Id. Significance varies with the setting of the proposed 
action. Id. “Intensity” refers to the severity of impact. Id. The following should be 
considered when evaluating intensity: (1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and 
adverse. Id. A significant effect may exist if the Federal agency believes that on balance 
the effect will be beneficial; (2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public 
health or safety; (3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to 
historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic 
rivers, or ecologically critical areas; (4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of 
the human environment are likely to be highly controversial; (5) The degree to which the 
effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly uncertain or 
involve unique or unknown risks . . . (9) The degree to which the action may adversely 
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An environmental assessment being merely outdated is not enough 
to make an agency’s reliance on one arbitrary and capricious.190 A judge 
must also make a finding that a change in circumstances makes reliance on 
the Assessment arbitrary and capricious.191 Regulations and cases from 
other districts should have indicated to the BIA such findings are possible. 
Sometimes agencies are not aware of an action’s compliance or 
noncompliance until they find themselves in court.192 However, both 
agencies and the public benefit from informed decision making about the 
environmental impacts of agencies’ programs and specific actions.   
In the past, there has been some uncertainty as to when site-
specific Environmental Impact Statements are required. Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statements serve as generic rules that can resolve 
sets of issues for purposes of case-specific Environmental Impact 
Statements.193 S. Utah Wilderness Alliance directs courts to first ask 
                                                                                                                         
affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat . . . (10) whether the action 
threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law. Id. 
190 Id. at 1310. 
191 Id. 
192 See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Gover, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1197 (D. S.D. 2000), 
vacated on other grounds. 
193 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 100-01 (1983) 
(citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
535 n.13 (1978)). 
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whether there is an ongoing action that invites supplementation. This is a 
fact-specific inquiry dependent on the surrounding conditions. In one case, 
the court found no site-specific analysis was necessary because no specific 
plans had yet been submitted.194 In another case, the court rejected that the 
agency should have prepared a site-specific Environmental Assessment 
instead of a broad Environmental Assessment leaving consideration of 
site-specific effects to later Assessments or Impact Statements.195 
Specifying the proper scope of an Environmental Impact Statement has 
been one of the most difficult questions for courts, and the form of action, 
details, functions, and facts have been considered in each case.196 
Challenging the BIA’s broad oil and gas leasing program is 
improper. Two Plaintiffs brought an action on their own behalf and on 
behalf of all surface owners and lessees in Osage County against the 
United States through the BIA and against Chaparral, among others.197 
                                                 
194 Def. of Wildlife v. Hall, 807 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (D. Mont. 2011) (no wolf removal 
plans had been submitted, and the agency properly concluded the wolf removal would not 
disrupt ecosystem functions or impact other species). 
195 High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1058 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012). 
196 William H. Rodgers, Jr., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—When—
Statement timing—Supplemental EISs—Programmatic EISs—Examples from Indian 
Country, ENVT. L. INDIAN COUNTRY § 1:23 (2015). 
197 Donelson v. U.S., 2016 WL 1301169, at *1 (N.D. Okla. 2016). Plaintiffs do not 
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Plaintiffs asserted under the APA and NEPA that since the 1979 
Assessment was prepared, there have been significant changes in relevant 
environmental laws, regulations, and drilling processes.198 Plaintiffs also 
alleged the Superintendent’s failure to evaluate environmental impacts 
prior to lease approval renders the oil and gas leases void ab initio, 
identifying about 20,000 active wells in the class area.199 In response, the 
Defendants contended because the Plaintiffs do not challenge any 
particular agency action, instead the entire oil leasing program, the 
allegations are insufficient to confer jurisdiction under the APA.200 Courts 
can intervene only when a specific final agency action has an actual or 
immediately threatened effect.201 The District Court for the Northern 
                                                                                                                         
include Hayes. On July 15, 2014, Robin Phillips, Superintendent for the Osage Agency, 
sent a letter to all lessees advising that all applications for permits to drill will require 
Environmental Assessments in the future as the result of another lawsuit in the same 
district. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Hayes v. Chaparral 
Energy, LLC, 2016 WL 1254427 (N.D. Okla. 2016). 
198 Donelson, 2016 WL 1301169, at *2. 
199 Id. Plaintiffs also asked the court to take judicial notice of the United States’ filings in 
U.S. v. Osage Wind, LLC, 2015 WL 5775378 (N.D. Okla. 2015), in which the US 
acknowledged its fiduciary duty to protect the Osage Mineral Estate. Donelson, 2016 WL 
1301169, at *6. 
200 Id. at *4. Programmatic improvement to agency programs are properly sought in the 
executive or legislative branches of government, unless Congress has created an 
appropriate exception. Id. (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 
(1990)). 
201 Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894). Prohibition also applies to an agency’s alleged 
failure to act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
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District of Oklahoma found against Plaintiffs because they challenged 
thousands of unspecified leases and drilling permits and did not identify 
even one particular agency action for challenge, precedent plainly 
prohibited the suit.202  
Additionally, the age of Environmental Assessments and Impact 
Statements can lead to hasty generalizations. Outdated Environmental 
Assessments or Impact Statements alone are not sufficient for NEPA 
noncompliance.203 In Coker, the Southern District of Mississippi held a 
fifteen year old Impact Statement for an entire flood control project could 
not serve as the basis for compliance with NEPA, and a supplemental 
Impact Statement was required.204 There, the Corps admitted the Impact 
Statement was outdated and ordered a supplemental Impact Statement 
because the river flowline may have changed.205 The court held an 
Environmental Impact Statement can become so outdated that it can no 
longer provide foundation for a subpart to be tiered to.206 The Corps’ 
decision not to supplement the Environmental Impact Statement was 
                                                 
202 Donelson, 2016 WL 1301169, at *4. Federal Defendants have sovereign immunity 
from Plaintiffs’ alleged programmatic NEPA violations. Id. at *5 n.2. 
203 Coker v. Skidmore, 941 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1991).  
204 Coker v. Skidmore, 744 F. Supp. 121, 121 (S.D. Miss. 1990). 
205 Id. at 124-25. 
206 Id. at 125.  
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arbitrary and capricious.207 However, Council on Environmental Quality 
regulations do not directly address whether an Environmental Impact 
Statement can become outdated.208 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held the Corps was not required to 
prepare a supplemental Impact Statement without a finding that there were 
significant new circumstances relevant to environmental concerns and 
bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.209 The proper inquiry was 
whether the Impact Statement was insufficient so as to require the 
preparation of a supplemental Impact Statement before the specific project 
(construction of a levee).210 The District Court erred in holding the Corps’ 
decision not to supplement the Impact Statement was arbitrary and 
capricious.211 A court may only order preparation of a supplemental 
Impact Statement if there are significant new circumstances relevant to 
environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its 
impacts.212 Instead of remanding for further findings, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded since the District Court agreed with the Corps that there was no 
                                                 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Coker v. Skidmore, 941 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1991). 
210 Id. at 1309. The specific project was construction of a levee. Id. at 1310. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (2014) and 33 C.F.R. § 230.11 (2014)). 
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evidence the levee itself would cause a significant environmental impact, 
there was no regulatory requirement for a supplemental Impact 
Statement.213 
Sometimes aged Impact Statements are acceptable. The Fifth 
Circuit perceived tiering regulations allow for gaps in time between 
programmatic Impact Statements and site-specific Environmental 
Assessments and focused on the site-specific project’s impacts.214 Other 
districts have followed the Fifth Circuit’s approach.215 Hayes did not 
actually allege the 1979 Environmental Assessment was outdated.216 
Rather, Hayes alleged there had been significant changes in drilling 
technology that were not considered in the 1979 Assessment, specifically 
increased fracking within Osage County.217 Hayes does not conflict with 
the Fifth Circuit’s view.  
                                                 
213 Id. at 1307. 
214 Mark T. Story, Environmental Law, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 271 (1993). 
215 See Becker v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 999 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1996) (Plaintiffs failed 
to show the original proposed action substantially changed or there were significant new 
circumstances or information relevant to the project and its environmental impact where a 
change of forty minutes in the projected train running time altered the project. Plaintiffs 
failed to note the mere age of an [Environmental Impact Statement] is not grounds for 
invalidation). See also Lone Tree Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2007 WL 
1520904 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
216 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hayes v. Chaparral, (No. 14-CV-
495-GKF-PJC), 2016 WL 51254427. 
217 Id.  
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Agencies do not need to supplement Impact Statements every time 
new information comes to light after the Impact Statement is finalized.218 
However, agencies have a continuing duty to supplement their Impact 
Statements, and agencies must supplement when there are significant new 
circumstances relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the 
proposed actions or its impacts. In future cases, reviewing an agency’s 
evaluation of the new circumstances may not be so easy, and the 
significance of new facts and circumstances may be difficult for agencies 
themselves to evaluate. Guidance on whether a particular new 
circumstance is “significant” is not particularly helpful to courts or 
agencies. New circumstances are significant where “new information 
provides a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape.”219 
So any given new fact may or may not be significant, depending on 
whether the agency perceives a particular new circumstance provides a 
seriously different picture of the environmental landscape and whether the 
agency’s decision about that new circumstance was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
                                                 
218 Marsh v. Or. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989). 
219 City of Olmsted Falls, OH v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
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B. Why are Government Lease Approvals So Important to 
Tribes? 
 
In a case similar to Hayes involving BIA lease approval, the lease 
agreement was for a hog production facility on tribal trust land in Mellette 
County, South Dakota.220 The Assistant Secretary of the BIA sent a letter 
to the tribe stating the Area Director’s lease approval for the project was 
void for failure to comply with NEPA.221 However, the Assistant 
Secretary was not aware of the lease’s noncompliance with NEPA until 
environmentalists and neighbors brought suit.222 The tribe and the 
company sought a temporary restraining order barring BIA action, and the 
court agreed with the Assistant Secretary that NEPA requirements likely 
had not been met.223 The District Court for the District of South Dakota 
disagreed with the Assistant Secretary’s methods because the conclusory 
letter did not offer analysis or explanation why the Assessment had been 
inadequate, and the letter had been sent four to five months after the 
Assistant Secretary learned of the NEPA violations.224 The court 
                                                 
220 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Gover, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1197 (D. S.D. 2000).  
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 1206. 
223 Id. at 1202. 
224 Id. at 1206. “It’s high time . . . the BIA conducts its affairs in a timely and business-
like manner to give confidence to Tribes, all Native Americans, their business partners, 
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concluded the BIA had taken a hard look and an Environmental Impact 
Statement was not required because of the alternatives’ narrow scope,225 
high controversy, or inadequate investigation of historic and cultural 
properties.226  
NEPA competence within the BIA would have helped, and the 
project should have been more thoroughly studied, evaluated, and 
permitted before it was rushed ahead.227 Later, newly elected Tribal 
Council decided they wanted the Assistant Secretary’s voiding of the lease 
approval upheld and entered into a land return agreement, continuing to 
lease only a fraction of what had previously been leased.228 Afterwards, 
management changed on the leased lands as well.229 
Further, tribes, individuals, and development companies are 
concerned with timely agency action. Courts may compel the agency to 
                                                                                                                         
and lending institutions so that they can rely upon the BIA to do what they say they are 
going to do. The principles of equity dictate that the Assistant Secretary’s decision cannot 
be upheld.” Id. 
225 Id. Private corporations are not required to consider alternatives that are not in their 
economic interest. Id. at 1209. 
226 Id. at 1213.  
227 William H Rodgers, Jr. & Elizabeth Burleson, National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) – Whether an EIS is Required – Major Actions and Significant Effects – 
Thresholds in Indian Country, Envt. L. Indian Country § 1:19 (2015). 
228 Vi Waln, Sun Prairie to Allow Ag Systems to Operate Hog Farm, LAKOTA COUNTRY 




act, but they cannot specify what the action must be.230 In a case about the 
government’s alleged failure to approve drilling permits, Hayes failed to 
plead facts tying the dispute to his property. Plaintiff, Osage Producers 
Association, brought an action pursuant to the APA against several 
government Defendants, alleging the government had unreasonably 
delayed issuing drilling permits, tacitly denying each and every permit 
pending before the Superintendent.231 Plaintiff’s complaint sought to 
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, 
processing pending drilling permits.232 The District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma held Hayes’ claimed interest of ensuring NEPA 
compliance on his land was not related to the subject of this action 
because the present litigation could not impair or impede his interest, 
regardless of the outcome, because the government must comply with 
NEPA.233 
Leases are an income source for tribes because of royalties, but 
further complications arise when fracking is involved. The federal 
                                                 
230 Osage Producers Ass’n v. Jewell, 2016 WL 80660, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2010) 
(quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). 
231 Id. at *1. 
232 Id. at *2.  
233 Id. at *3. 
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government estimates ninety percent of wells drilled on federal and Indian 
lands used fracking in 2013.234 Gas drillers’ operations involve hundreds 
of truckloads and many hours of industrial operations, and there may be 
accidental spills and fires along with odors, lighting, and noises at the 
well.235 Rural roads are not designed for major industrial cargoes, which 
may pose a serious threat to neighbors.236 Neighbors bear all of the burden 
from fracking because the landowners will at least be compensated under 
the leases’ terms.237 Neighbors can also expect night flaring of burning 
gases and clouds of chemical dust.238 
NEPA applies to several steps of the federal lands leasing process 
and affects oil and gas development activities. However, Environmental 
Impact Statements result in multilayer delays and multi-million dollar 
costs.239 In one case concerning a well drilling, an oil and gas exploration 
company filed an application and permit to drill with the agency, and the 
                                                 
234 Rita Ann Cicero, Feds ask 10th Circuit to Expedite Fracking Review, 36 No. 16 
WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 10, at *1 (Mar. 2, 2016). 
235 James T. O’Reilly, Litigation About Fracking Wells & Waste, The Law of Fracking § 




239 Timothy M. Miller, et. al., Leasing Federal Oil and Gas, 32 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 
14.06 (2011).  
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agency completed an Environmental Assessment and issued a FONSI.240 
Plaintiffs, two nonprofit organizations, alleged the agencies failed to 
comply with NEPA in approving the drilling permit application.241 The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held the agencies’ 
action was arbitrary and capricious.242 Years later, the agencies published 
their notice of intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the 
drilling project.243 The agencies later published a revised notice of intent 
years after that.244 Even later, the company withdrew the drilling permit 
application, cancelling the project, making the need to prepare the Impact 
Statement unnecessary.245 So, sometimes agencies will have wasted their 
time and money when the lessee decides not to pursue its project. 
Reform within the BIA is necessary to allow for timely and lawful 
compliance among leases. However, courts are not equipped to address 
this broad issue and can only address specific cases and controversies that 
                                                 
240 Anglers of Au Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 402 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829 (E.D. Mich. 
2005). 
241 Id. at 828. 
242 Id. at 835. 
243 Dep’t of Agric., Forest Service, Huron-Manistee National Forests, Michigan, USA 
and State South Branch 1-8 Well, 75 Fed. Reg. 8297 (Feb. 24, 2010). 
244 Dep’t of Agric., Forest Service, Huron-Manistee National Forests, Michigan, USA 
and State South Branch 1-8 Well, 77 Fed. Reg. 1665 (Jan. 11, 2012). 
245 Dep’t of Agric., Forest Service, Huron-Manistee National Forests, Michigan, USA 
and State South Branch 1-8 Well, 77 Fed. Reg. 58807 (Sept. 24, 2012). 
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arise. Congress or the Department of the Interior are better suited to 
evaluate, revise, and implement BIA procedures for lease approvals, all 
while being mindful that regulations require agencies to consider whether 
there are significant new circumstances affecting their actions.  
While this decision may disfavor the oil industry because of time 
and resources spent on Environmental Assessments, tribes will likely not 
be affected. Oil development companies will likely still be interested in 
fracking, so incurring the costs of Environmental Assessments likely will 
not deter them as long as the lease approval process is not too time-
consuming. As a result, tribes will still receive royalties.  
C. Department of the Interior Fracking Regulations 
In 2012, the Department of the Interior proposed more stringent 
fracking regulations in respect to chemical disclosure, well integrity, 
formation integrity, and water management.246 The argument against more 
regulations is that more regulations would require too much information 
for an agency to review before promptly issuing an authorization.247 
                                                 
246 See L. Poe Leggette, et. al, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Proposed Regulation 




Depending on the well’s location, several permits may be required.248 
Some commenters believe the cost of compliance with several sets of 
regulation is far more than the cost of remediating rare cases where 
fracking causes damage.249 
In 2015, the District Court for the District of Wyoming issued a 
preliminary injunction stopping implementation of the new fracking 
regulations on all public and Indian lands.250 The court ruled the 
Department of the Interior lacked authority from Congress to regulate non-
diesel fracking on public lands.251 The trade associations argued the Safe 
Drinking Water Act252 gives exclusive authority to regulate underground 
injections to states and the EPA.253 The agency contended the regulations 
merely supplement existing Department of the Interior requirements.254 
The court found the agency’s argument unpersuasive because Congress 
                                                 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 15-043, 2015 WL 5845145 (D. Wyo. Sept. 
30, 2015).  
251 Id. 
252 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2012).  
253 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Int., 136 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1353–54 (D. Wyo. 2015), 
vacated and remanded sub nom Wyoming v. Sierra Club, 15-8126, 2016 WL 3853806 
(10th Cir. July 13, 2016). 
254 Id. 
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mostly exempted fracking from federal regulation, except when diesel fuel 
is injected into the ground.255  
The agency and six environmental groups appealed the district 
court’s injunction.256 Appellants argued the injunction impairs the 
agency’s ability to fulfill its statutory duty to ensure oil and gas operations 
on federal and Indian lands are properly conducted.257 During the public 
comment period after the rule was proposed, many of the 1.5 million 
comments submitted either supported the rule or wanted it to be more 
protective of the environment.258 
D. Post-Hayes 
Post Hayes, the Osage Minerals Council (“Council”) filed a motion 
to dismiss for failure to join a necessary and indispensable party.259 Since 
the Council is part of Osage Nation which possesses sovereign immunity, 
the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma held joinder was 
                                                 
255 Id. “Congress clearly expressed intent that non-diesel hydraulic fracturing be removed 
from the realm of federal regulation, thereby lodging authority to regulate that authority 
within the states and tribes.” Id. 
256 Wyoming v. Jewell, Nos. 15-8126 and 15-8134, 2016 WL 680277, appellants’ joint 
motion filed (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 2016). 
257 Id. at *6. 
258 Id. 
259 Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC, 2016 WL 1175238, at *1 
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 23, 2016). 
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not feasible and therefore not required.260 The Council’s presence was 
unnecessary to accord complete relief among the existing parties: Hayes, 
Chaparral, and the BIA,261 and the government had adequately represented 
the Council’s interests.262 The government proposed a remedial alternative 
to lessen or avoid prejudice to the Council, suggesting that the court 
identify the legal error in the lease approval and remand the case to the 
agency without voiding the lease.263  
That remedy would be inconsistent with Sangre, which held the 
invalid lease contract there vested no property interest in Sangre.264 When 
a lease requires agency approval to be legally operative and a court later 
determines the agency approved a lease in violation of NEPA, that 
determination necessarily invalidates the underlying lease unless or until 
valid agency approval.265 Sangre made it clear that there is no meaningful 
distinction between a ruling that the Superintendent’s lease approval 
violates NEPA and a ruling declaring the lease invalid.266 The holding in 
                                                 
260 Id. at *2. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at *3.  
263 Id. at *5. 
264 Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. U.S., 932 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1991). 
265 Hayes, 2016 WL 1175238, at *10. 
266 Id. at *6. As a result, the court modifies and clarifies its order to remand the case to 
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Hayes that the Environmental Assessment is inadequate does not 
necessarily result in prejudice to the Council because the only result will 
be a new Assessment for the Superintendent to consider, which does not 
call for any action by or against the Council.267 Chaparral and the Council 
still may obtain valid agency approval.268 Dismissal would insulate an 
entire category of agency action from judicial review, precluding review 
of the Superintendent’s oil and gas lease approval and drilling permits, so 
the court would not dismiss for failure to join the Council.269 
Then, the court amended its opinion so the lease and drilling 
permits are no longer void ab initio, they are invalid instead. Hayes did 
not declare the lease permanently invalid; it merely determined that a 
condition precedent, the Superintendent’s valid lease approval, had not 
been performed. As a result, the lease had no legal effect.270 Void ab initio 
would foreclose some equitable remedies, which is one reason the Council 
                                                                                                                         
the agency for further administrative proceedings. Id. at *11 n.6.  
267 Id. at *9. 
268 Id. At one point the Council suggested it could sue the BIA for damages, but 
sovereign immunity would bar such litigation. Id. at *11 n.3. Additionally, Chaparral has 
since filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sold its leases to Warrior Exploration & 
Production, LLC (“Warrior”). Opening Brief for Intervenor Defendant-Appellant at *9, 
Hayes v. Osage Minerals, (No. 16-5060), 2016 WL 5407598, at *9. However, Warrior 
and the Council may still obtain valid agency approval. 
269 Id. at *11. 
270 Id. at *3, 6. 
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made the motion to intervene as an indispensable party.271 The court did 
not mean to suggest the lease was permanently invalid.272 Use of the term 
“invalid” fits more closely with all the opinions considered in this case 
note, including Sangre. Further, the complaint itself seeks a declaratory 
judgment that the lease and drilling permit are invalid so as to support a 
trespass claim.273 The court remands the case for further agency 
proceedings, which is consistent with Hillsdale.  
V. CONCLUSION 
While the costs of agency compliance with NEPA are high, 
Congress intended agency compliance when it enacted NEPA because the 
public generally benefits from informed decision-making. The BIA should 
shoulder the costs of compliance or require lessees to do so,274 but 
                                                 
271 Judge Frizzell’s determination that the Council was not an indispensable party will be 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, meaning there is only a limited chance the Tenth 
Circuit will reverse the order. 
272 Id. at *11 n.6. 
273 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hayes v. Chaparral at 1, (No. 14-
CV-495-GKF-PJC), 2016 WL 54212. Although it also asks that the oil and gas leases be 
voided ab initio elsewhere. See generally id. The complaint also seeks compensatory 
damages, so the Tenth Circuit should not be persuaded by the Council’s argument that 
Hayes’ claims are moot because Hayes may still obtain compensatory damages from 
Chaparral’s bankruptcy estate. See generally First Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief (Dkt. No. 2) at 12, Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, -- F. Supp. 3d 
– (2016) (Case No. 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC), 2016 WL 1254427. 
274 The lessee has the responsibility of conducting and completing the Environmental 
Assessment, so the lessees pay for Assessments. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(b) (2014). Then 
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remedial measures should be taken to ensure BIA competency and 
efficiency because tribes may be relying on the royalties from the leases. 
Tribes often do not want to delay the process because delay could possibly 
cause development companies to lose interest. Because most fracking 
regulation is left to the states, the least agencies can do is prepare or 
approve lessee-prepared Assessments for lease approvals and drilling 
permits when the circumstances so require. Normally, agencies are in the 
best position to evaluate when external circumstances have changed 
sufficiently from past Assessments, not courts. Hayes and Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe are extraordinary cases of BIA noncompliance with NEPA.275 The 
BIA’s internal procedures may need to be reworked internally or by the 
Department of the Interior to avoid NEPA compliance problems with lease 
approvals in the future without taking a substantially longer time. Parties 
will want to avoid the time-consuming and monetary costs of litigation 
like this one.               ERIKA DOPUCH 
                                                                                                                         
the BIA makes a FONSI or a Finding of Significant Impact. See generally Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hayes v. Chaparral (No. 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC), 2016 
WL 54212. 
275 Plenty of Notices of Intent to Prepare Environmental Impact Statements, Draft 
Environmental Statements, and Final Environmental Statements are available for viewing 
and comment in the Federal Register. See generally 
https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/indian-affairs-bureau.  

